When is foreign aid policy credible : aid dependence and conditionality by Svensson, Jakob
\/PsI  rL4o
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1740
When is Foreign Aid  Disbursements  of foreign aid
are guided (in part) by the
Policy Credible?  needs of the poor.
Anticipating this, recipients
have little incentive to Aid  Dependence and Conditionality  improvethewelfareofthe
poor. The welfare of all
Jakob Svensson  parties  might be improved  by
tied project aid and by
delegating part of the aid
budget to an (international)
agency with less  aversion to
poverty.
The World Bank
Policy Research Department  _

















































































































dPOLICY RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER 1740
Summary  findings
Svensson studies foreign aid policy within a principal-  In principle, conditionality could partly solve this
agent framework. He shows that one reason for foreign  problern, but only if the donor  can make a binding
aid's poor overall record may be a moral hazard problem  commitment tc  increase disbursements in good relative
that shapes the aid recipient's incentive to undertake  to bad states. Without such a commitment technology,
structural reform. The model's basic prediction is a two-  aid disbursements remain guided by the needs of the
way relationship: Disbursements of foreign aid are  poor and recipient countries maintain a low effort to
guided (in part) by the needs of the poor. Anticipating  reduce poverty.
this, recipients have little incentive to improve the  Contrary to the conventional wisdom found in the aid
welfare of the poor.  Iiterature, Svensson shows that the welfare of all parties
Preliminary econometric work shows that the data  might be improved by using tied project aid or by
support this hypothesis.  delegating part of the aid budget to an (international)
agency  with less aversion to poverty.
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Over the past few years Kenya  has performed  a curious mating  ritual
with its aid donors.  The steps are: one,  Kenya wins its yearly pledges
of foreign  aid.  Two,  the government  begins to  misbehave,  backtrack-
ing  on  economic  reform  and  behaving in  an  authoritarian  manner.
Three,  a new meeting  of donor countries  looms with exasperated for-
eign governments  preparing their sharp rebukes.  Four, Kenya  pulls  a
placatory rabbit out of the hat.  Five,  the donors are mollified and the
aid is pledged.  The  whole dance then starts  again  [THE  ECONOMIST
(August  19th,  1995)].
When is foreign aid policy  credible?  The quotation  above on the relationship
between the Kenyan government  and the donor community seems to confirm that
it is indeed a relevant question.  Despite this, the voluminous literature  on foreign
aid and  development  has  only to  a limited  extent  dealt  with  incentive  problems
in the  donor-recipient  relationship.  In  particular,  the  issues of credibility  and
institutional  design  to  mitigate  time-consistency  problems  in foreign  aid policy
Ihave  not  been addressed  at  all.
In many developing  countries foreign assistance  is an important  source of rev-
enue.  For example, for the 40 most aid-dependent  countries the mean value of aid
as share of government  revenue for the period  1970-89 was 56 percent.1
What  has this vast  amount  of foreign aid achieved?  The sizable literature  on
the effects of aid can roughiy be divided into two main areas:  microeconomic eval-
uations  of projects  and  assessments  of the macroeconomic  impact  of aid.  White
,(1992) summarizes  the  results  of this  literature  with  the  so called macro-micro
paradox,  concluding  that,  whilst  micro-level evaluations  have been, by and large,
positive,  those  of the macro  evidence have, at best,  been ambiguous.
The macro-micro  paradox  raises  questions  of the  efficiency of foreign aid and
aid policy.  Even though  the  state  of the  art  is somewhat  unclear,  some general
conclusions  have  emerged  in  the  literature.  First,  it  is argued  that  the  weak
macro performance  of aid in many developing countries is largely due to unsound
domestic  policies  in  the  recipient  countries.  Second,  conditionality  is a way to
deal with  such macroeconomic  mismanagement.  Third, the most  efficient way to
give aid is through  untied program support  [see e.g. Cassen (1986) and Krueger et
al.  (1989)]. Hence, tying  aid to  a specific source within the  donor country  is bad
ifor  the poor  in the recipient  country,  and is viewed only as a method  to  increase
the commercial  impact  of the  aid program.  Finally, there  exists  a vast  literature
criticizing the policies of the World Bank and the IMF. One of the arguments  put
'Data  compiled from the OECD and the IFS data base.
1forward  is that  a donor  with  stronger  emphasis on poverty  alleviation  will strike
a better  balance  between  efficiency and  flexibility  [see e.g.  Havnevik  (1987) and
the  discussion in Summers  et al.  (1993)].
In this  paper  we show that  once we start  looking at  incentive  effects of aid
these statements  need to be rethought.  Our model suggests that  one reason for the
poor  aggregate  record of past  aid disbursements  may be  a moral hazard  problem
adversely affecting the aid recipients' incentive to undertake  structural  reforms.  In
principle,  conditionality  could partly  solve the problem, but  this  requires a strong
commitment  ability  by the  donor.  Without  such a commitment  technology,  aid
disbursements  are guided by the  needs of the poor,  resulting  in low effort on the
part  of the recipient  governments to alleviate poverty. Hence, we will end up in an
aid policy cycle similar to what  is described  in the quotation  from the Economist.
Contrary  to conventional  wisdom in the  aid literature,  we show that  tied project
aid as well as delegation  of part  of the  aid budget  to  an  (international)  agency
with  less aversion to poverty  may improve welfare for all parties.
This paper  is related to the literature  on Samaritan's  dilemma and soft-budget
constraints. 2 By studying  the problem within  a simple principal-agent  model, our
analysis should be  regarded  as complementing  this  work.  However, the key con-
tribution  of the paper  is not  in basic theory,  but  in integrating  these conceptual
frameworks with  the policy discussion on foreign aid.  This provides  a framework
to  form&lize the  idea of conditionality  and  is the  first contribution  of the paper.
Moreover, by  analyzing  a  setup  with  several  recipients,  a  coordination  problem
in  foreign  aid policy  is identified:  strategic  manipulations  by each  recipient  in
order to  increase  the  share  of the  aid disbursed  lead to  inefficiently low levels of
investment  (or effort  exerted).  The  second  contribution  is normative.  We de-
scribe two institutional  arrangements  that  mitigate  the time-consistency  problem
in  foreign aid  policy,  namely  delegation  of part  of the  aid budget  to  a  donor
with  less aversion to  poverty,  and  tied project  aid.  Finally, we provide  evidence
that  neatly  fits the  model's  basic  prediction  of a  two-way relation:  foreign aid
is  (partly)  disbursed  according  to the  needs  of the poor,  and  the  anticipation  of
this  adversely  affects the  recipients'  incentives to  carry  out  policies  that  would
improve the poor's welfare.  In particular,  while there  is no evidence that  the poor
benefit  from aid, an  exogenous increase in income (due to variations  in the terms
of trade)  has a positive impact  on social development.  This finding indicates that
the  aid relationship  may create  adverse incentive constraints  that  undermine  the
overall purpose  of assisting  the  poor.  By estimating  a simultaneous  system,  we
blend  together  two  strands  of empirical  literature  on aid:  on the  one hand  the
2See Kornai (1980a,b) for discussions  and Dewatripont & Maskin (1991)  and Qian & Roland
(1994) for models of the soft budget constraint.  The Samaritan's dilemma is formalized by,
among others, Lindbeck & Weibull (1988). See for example Coate (1995) for references.
2literature  on  the  determinants  of aid  allocations,  on  the  other  hand  the  literature
on the  effects  of these  aid  flows.3
The  remainder  of this  paper  is organized  as follows.  In  section  2 the  model  is
presented  and  the  contract  solutions  are  briefly  described.  In  section  3 we study
the  equilibrium  outcome  under  discretion.  Alternative  aid  institutions  are  pre-
sented  in  section  4, and  finally,  in section  5 some  empirical  evidence  is provided.
Throughout  the  paper,  the  most  important  results  are  summarized  in  proposi-
tions.
2.  A  Model  of  Strategic  Aid  Dependence  and  Conditional-
ity
Conditionality,  and  particularly  macroeconomic  conditionality,  has  emerged  as
ain important  component  in  foreign  aid  in  the  1980s  and  1990s.  Even  though
conditionality  may  reflect  bureaucratic  requirements  within  the  donor  country,
or  simply  represent  a  convenient  method  of  packing  and  coordinating  foreign
assistance,  the  most  important  motive  is  to  address  incentive  problems  in  the
donor-recipient  relationship.
The major  aim of stabilization  and  structural  reform  assistance  is to facilitate  a
miove towards  a sustainable  fiscal  situation,  where  the  recipient  can  finance  its own
social  objectives.  Since  aid  resources  are  limited,  an  altruistic  donor  would  like to
allocate  resources  to  those  in most  need.  At  the  same  time,  fiscal  imbalances  are
due  partly  to the  state  of the  world,  partly  to the  adjustment  effort  exerted  by  the
recipient.  Given  that  the  donor  cannot  perfectly  monitor  or verify  the  recipients'
adjustment  efforts,  the  donor  faces  a standard  moral  hazard  problem.  Moreover,
this  problem  is reinforced  by  an adverse  competition  for aid  across  recipients:  each
lowering  effort  in order  to  receive  a larger  share  of the  total  aid budget.  Of course,
the  problem  of moral  hazard  is not  limited  to  structural  adjustment  assistance,
but  prevalent  in many  aid  programs  in which  the  donor  and  recipient  interact.
To concentrate  on  the  time  consistency  issue  in  foreign  aid  policy  and  related
normative  issues,  we will throughout  the  analysis  treat  the  donor  and  the  recipient
3See Maizels & Nissanke (1984), Frey et al.  (1985), Frey & Schneider (1986) and Gang
&; Lehman (1990) for studies involving simple correlations and multiple regressions on cross-
sectional data.  See Dudley & Montmarquette  (1976), Mosley (1985) and Trumbull & Wall
(1994) for formal models of aid allocations. Assessments of the macroeconomic impact of aid
date back at  least to the study by Griffin (1970). Griffin (1970) found a negative correlation
between aid and savings, generating a series  of responses. In the papers that followed,  substantial
econometric problems were often recognized but was not dealt with in a satisfactory manner.
Boone (1994,1995)  and to some extent Mosley et al. (1987) are exceptions.
3governments as single decision units.  Hence, problems in aid policy steaming  from
divided governments  in the  recipient  countries  are assumed  away.  This  is not to
say that  these issues are not  important.4 Moreover, to simplify the exposition, we
consider only two types  of informational  settings:  (i) the case where  adjustment
effort is perfectly  observable,  (ii) the  case in  which  only  aggregate  outcome  is
observable.  These two setups  are not  considered to  be the  best  characterization
of reality, but  to provide  a simple but  yet rigorous structure  in which to  analyze
normative  issues in foreign aid policy.
2.1.  The  Model
Consider  the  following two-period  model  consisting  of one  bilateral  donor  and
two recipients.  In each period t the recipient  government i determines  the alloca,
tion of public funds  (yit) between government  consumption,  i.e. non-development
spending  (git),  and  development  spending  (dit), where development  spending  is
interpreted  as spending  benefiting the  poor  in the  recipient  country.  In the  first
period, the recipients also make an investment  choice (or exert effort), denoted  by
ki.  We assume that  the public  funds in period  1 are exogenously given, equal to
y, while government  income in period 2 depends  on the  adjustment  effort (or in-
vestment)  exerted  in period  1 and the state  of the world.  The budget constraints
are  gil + dil + ki < y  andgi2  +di 2 <  y(ki).
The relation between government  spending,  adjustment  effort and the state  of
the world is captured  in the  simplest possible way. Hence:
y(k  ) _J  -y  with probability  q
Y  ti  /3 with  probability  (1 - q)
where  -y >  3 >  0.  Investing  more resources  makes the  good  state  more  likely.
Hence, we postulate  that  0 < ki  < y, and that  the probability  q is an increasing
and  concave function  q(ki), such that  q(O) > 0, q(y) <  1.
The donor has  altruistic  motives for giving foreign aid.  More specifically, we
assume that  aid is used to produce  a good or service, denoted  by hit, benefiting
the poor.  We assume that  h is an increasing  and  concave function  h(ait),  where
ait represents  the  (non-contingent)  amount  of aid  disbursed  to  country  i.5 The
4See Svensson  (1996) and Casella & Eichengreen (1994) for models of decentralized decision
making  and  the  effects of foreign assistance  and  Boycko et  al.  (1996) for a discussion  of divided
governments  and  aid.
sThe  consideration  of aid as a factor  of production  has a long tradition,  dating  back at  least
to the  study  by Chenery  & Strout  (1966).  In this  setup,  ai can be  interpreted  either  as project
aid, or  as program  aid such  as import-support.  An  alternative  interpretation  is to think  of aid
as  pure  cash  transfers,  but  that  due  to  bureaucratic  or  institutional  factors  the  recipient  has
4poor  derives utility  from  consuming the  good, which  is either  produced  by the
donor's  resources  according  to  h(.),  or provided  by the  recipient  government,  d.
Alternatively  one could think of the government  producing the good with  a linear
technology.  Thus, total  (public) consumption  of the poor in recipient  country i is
cit = dit + h(ait)
The ith  recipient's  time-separable  quasi-linear  utility  function  is:
wi  =  V(Cii)  +  ±  gii  +  U(Ci2)  +  U(gi 2)  (2.1)
where  p denotes  the  constant  marginal  utility  of government  consumption  in
period  1.  We  assume  that  u  and  v  are  differentiable,  increasing  and  concave
fuMctions.6
The donor-agency  is risk averse with  preferences for consumption  of the poor
in the recipient  countries.  Hence, the  donor-agency's  preference function,  WD,  iS
simply the sum of the utility  of the poor  in the two periods:
2  2
WD  =  E  E  U (Cit)  (2.2)
t=1  i=1
The donor is endowed with  a fixed aid budget  in each period,  A. The  amount  of
resources  earmarked  for development  aid by donor  countries  is often determined
internally  in  the  budget  process.  Therefore  it  is in  this  context  reasonable  to
assumne  it to be exogenous.  Note, however, that  the total  amount  of aid disbursed
to each individual country will be endogenous in the model.  The budget constraint
for the donor  is simply:
2
A =Zat(s),  s E S  (2.3)
where ait(s)  represents  the  state  contingent  amount  of aid disbursed to  country i
in aggregate  state  s.  S is the set  of all possible  aggregate states  in period  2. We
assume that  the shocks in the two countries  are independently  distributed.  Thus,
there  are four possible  aggregate states  in the model:
(/3,  ,B)  with probability  (1  - q(el)) (1-  q(e 2))
_  (/, y)  with probability  (1-  q(el)) q(e 2) j-(^y,/)  with  probability  q(el) (1-q(e 2 ))
(-y,  y)  with probability  q(el)q(e2)
wvhere (-y, 3)  denotes  the  aggregate state  when recipient  1 is in a good state  and
r  ecipient 2 is in a bad state,  and symmetrically for the other three aggregate states.
limited  absorption capacity. Thus, aid will have a falling marginal product  [cf. Cassen et aL
(1986) and  Karlstr6m  (1991)].
6For technical  reason  we also assume that  u"'  >  0.
5It  is convenient  to  define the  subset  of symmetric  states,  S3,  and  the  subset  of
asymmetric  states,  Sa, given by: S3 =  {(-y, y), (/,  B3)},  and  Sa =  {(-y, /), (/,  y)}.
To focus on the trade  off between optimal  incentives and  optimal budget  sup-
port,  the  following implicit  assumption  about  the  parameters  of the  model  is
made:
Assumption  1.  It  is never optimal for  the donor to write a contract such that
the country in  a good state  receives more aid than the country in  a bad state.
This  two-period  model  defines a game  among the  recipients  and  the  donor.
At the beginning  of the  game the three  actors play a noncooperative  game with
respect to the  allocation  of aid and public funds.  In the first stage,  the recipients
also make investment  choices that  in a stochastic  way determine  the  outcome  in
period  2.  In the  last  stage  of the  game, the  donor and  the  two recipients  again
play a noncooperative  game with respect to the allocation  of aid and public funds
between  development  spending  and  government  consumption.  We will consider
three  different  settings.  In the  first case, the  effort choices (investment)  are ob-
served by the  donor.  Moreover, the  donor can  commit to  a policy  rule  ex ante.
In the second scenario, we relax the assumption  of full observability by assuming
that  the donor can only verify the outcomes in period 2. Finally, and more realis-
tically, we relax the assumption  of commitment,  and consider the case where it is
impossible to  commit  aid policy in advance.  Within  this  latter  setup,  we analyze
the impact  of different  institutional  changes.
2.2.  Optimal  Contract  when  Adjustment  Effort  is  Observable  and  the
Donor  Can  Commit:  First  Best
Suppose that  the donor can comnit  to a policy rule ex ante and,  as a benchmark,
that  effort is fully observable.  The optimal contract  specifies adjustment  effort (or
investment)  for each recipient  and  the allocation  of aid across the  two countries.
Two remarks  about  this  setup  is in  order.  First,  even though  the  total  aid
budget  is fixed, the  level of aid disbursed  to  each  individual  country  is endoge-
nous.  Second, aid is totally  fungible in the model,  implying that  in each period,
given the  disbursement  of aid, the  recipient  will allocate  public  funds so as to
equalize the marginal  utility  of consumption  between g and  c. Consequently,  the
Nash equilibrium in the final stage of the game results  in spending functions Ci(s)
and Gi(s), where Ci(s)  [Gi(s)] denotes total  consumption  of the poor  [government
consumption]  in country i in aggregate state  s, given the aid inflow ai(s).  Solving
for the equilibrium  configuration  of c and g in the  last  stage of the  game yields:
Ci(s)  = Ci(s) =  2 [y(ki) + h (ai(s))].  The solution to the  aid disbursement  prob-
lem in period  1 is trivial.  Since both  recipients  are equal ex ante, ail =  A/2,  and
6d-  =  -1  (5o)-h(A/2).'
The  optimal  contract  is  found  by  solving  the  program  of  maxinizing  the
donor's expected utility  subject to the recipients'  individual rationality  constraints
l(R) and the budget  constraint  (2.3).  Hence, for a given level of adjustment  effort
(investment),  ki = k, the  optimal  compositiorn of aid across countries  and  states
mn  period  2 is defined by the  following maximization  program:
2
max  ~E E  Q(s)U  (Ci(s))  (2.4)
{It(s),a2(a)}  i=1  seS
subject  to:
2
Zai(s)<A,  VseS  (2.5)
and:
v(e) +  po(y  - d* - k) + 2 EQ(s)u  (Ci(s)) >  Ewi=, i -, 2  (2.6)
ses
where  we have  explored  the  properties  of the  synmetric  Nash  equilibrium  in
the  last  stage of the  game, and  where Q (s)  denotes the  probability  of aggregate
state  s  e  S,  aj(s)  is a vector  of state-contingent  aid  disbursements  to  country
i  for all  s  E  S,  e  v'(-cp),  and  Ew9  is recipient  i:s  expected  utility  without
atid.  For convenience,  time  subscripts  have  been  dropped.  Let  superscript  1
denotes  the  first-best  equilibrium.  The  important  properties  of this  subgame
perfect  equilibrium  are summarized  below.
Proposition  2.1.  The optimal contract when k is contractible (first-best) is char-
acterized  by four conditions: (i) the first-best  equilibrium  entails full consumption
smoothing  across countries,  (ii) the equilibrium  aid flows are independent  of the
probability  function  q and the  cost of adjustment  y7, (iii)  the  optimal amount  of
effort is higher than  in the equilibrium  without  aid,  (iv) the IR-constraints  bind.
Proof.  See appendix  1.  E
Hence,  since  effort is contractible  it  is always  optimal  to  give aid to  those
in most  need,  resulting  in  an equalization  of the mnarginal utilities  of aid across
countries  in equilibrium.  Moreover, since the  donor  does not  derive  any  utility
from government  consumption,  the  IR-constraints  must  bind.  That  is the  donor
i(and the poor  group)  sklims off the entire  surplus from the  recipient  government,
and  the  recipient  government  is no  better  off with  aid than  without.  In  other
words, by giving conditional  aid in an environment where the donor can commit,
the  donor  in practise  buys  a certain  amount  of effort in exchange  for the  aid it
disburses.
7We assume that  A and y are sufficiently  large to guarantee an interior solution.
72.3.  Optimal  Contract  when  Adjustment  Effort  is  Not  Verifiable  and
the  Donor  Can  Commit:  Second  Best
In reality adjustment  effort is seldom observable in all of its dimension.  Typically
certain  elements are verifiable while others  are less tangible.  Without  loss of gen-
erality, we consider below the case where the recipients'  policies are not verifiable
at  all.  In such  a setting,  the  optimal  contract  can only be made  conditional  on
the  observable state  of the world.
The optimal contract  is derived as in previous subsection, except that  there  are
now two additional  conditions  that  constrain  the maximization  program,  namely
the two IC-constraints,  given by-8
q((k1) [51 - A 1] =°  (2.7)
where:
521  _2q(k 2)u (C1('  -Y))  + 2(1  - q(k2)) u (ClQy,/3))  (2.8)
A1 2q(kz)u (C1(3, -y)) + 2 (1 - q(kz)) u (C1(,3, /3))  (2.9)
and  corresponding  constraint  for recipient  2.  The IC-constraint  (2.7) has  an  in-
tuitive  interpretation.  The  left hand  side of (2.7) captures  the  expected  gain of
higher adjustment  effort, treating  the  other recipient's  choice of k as given, while
the  right  hand  side is the  marginal  cost,  so. The cost  takes the  form of reduced
govermment consumption  in period  1, while the expected benefit  is the product  of
the marginal  increase  in the probability  of a good state  times the relative  change
in utility  of such an increase in q.
We denote  the second-best  equilibrium  with  superscripts  2.  Solving the max-
imization program  yields:
Proposition  2.2.  The optimal  contract when k is not  contractible  (second-best)
is characterized by four conditions;  (i) there is less than  full consumption  smooth-
ing across countries, ai?(s)  = A/2  for all s E S8, and a4(3, -y)  =  4 (y, 3)  < 4 (/3,  7),
and al (y, /) =  4 (3, y) >  ai (7y,  3),  (ii)  the optimal amount  of effort is lower than
in the first  best, k2 < k1,  (iii)  the equilibrium aid flows depend  on the exogenous
parameters  of the model,  (iv) the IR-constraints  do not  bind.
Proof.  See appendix  2. E
Again  this  result  is intuitive.  The  second best  contract  is a compromise  be-
tween giving aid to those in most need and providing optimal incentives.  In order
8We  have  replaced  the infinite  set of relative  incentive  constraints  with a single  "first-order
constraint"  (see appendix  A.2).
8to induce  the  recipient  to  exert  higher  effort,  aid  flows in bad  states  must  be
lowered and aid flows in good states  raised.  Note,  that  there  are two forces that
drive the  equilibrium  away from the  first-best.  First,  there  is a  "moral  hazard"
in that  full consumption  smoothing  lowers the  incentive to  invest or exert  effort
ex ante.  This  distortion  is reinforced  by  an  adverse competition  for aid  across
recipients.  Since the  two recipients  act non-cooperatively  they  do not  take  into
account  the  effects of domestic  policy choices on the  other  country.  Given that
*the  donor's  resources are limiited, the choice of adjustment  effort in country i will
affect the  expected welfare of country j.  This is so because the  higher effort ex-
erted by recipient  i, the  less likely it ends up  in the bad  state  and the  less likely
it is that  the country  will receive as much foreign assistance.  This in turn  implies
that  expected  aid to  country  j  rises.  Hence, there  exists  a positive  externality
between expected  aid disbursement  to country j and  adjustment  effort in country
i.  The recipients  will not  internalize  this  externality  when choosing k,  resulting
in underinvestment  in both  recipient  countries.
3.  Discretion:  Third  Best
Contracts  of the form described in section 2.3 and 2.4 have been suggested to solve
the moral  hazard  problem  present  in many  donor-recipient  relations.  However,
enforcing  such  contracts  are  difficult.  Ex  post,  once the  recipients'  choices of
adjustment  effort are  determined  and  the  shock  realized,  the  donor-agency  has
incentives to increase disbursements  to the country in most need.  The anticipation
that this will happen  will in turn  affect the incentive to carry out politically costly
adjustment  policies ex ante.
To analyze the  game it is convenient to define expected utility  of the if  recip-
ient as function  of investment  levels and aid disbursements:
Wi(kl,,k2,al(s),a 2(s))  =v(()  +o(y-di*,-ki)  + q(ki)Qi +  (1-q(ki))A~i  (3.1)
and  symmetrically  for country  2.
Definition  3.1.  The  discretionary  equilibrium  is  a  vector  of  feasible  policies
(ki,k2,aI,a2)  such  that:  (i)  a,  =  argmax  'it=(et)  VS E  S,  s.t.  the  donor's
budget  constraint,  (ii) ki  =  argmax  W1(.),  given  k2,  (iii)  k2 =  argmaxW 2 (-),
given ki.
'We denote  the  equilibrium  adjustment  levels  in  the  discretionary  equilibrium  by
k
3 . The  important  properties  of this  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  are  stated  in
the  following  Proposition.
9Proposition  3.2.  The discretionary equilibrium entails full consumption  smooth-
ing a3(s) = al(s),  but  too low adjustment  effort, k3 < k2 .
Proof.  The  discretionary  equilibrium  is found  by backward  induction.  In the
last stage of the game, the  donor determines  the  allocation  of aid across the  two
countries,  taking  the  composition  of public  funds in the  second period  as given.
The first-order  condition  can be stated  as follows:
u' (Cl(s))  h'(a,(s))  - u' (C2(s)) h'(a 2 (s)) = 0,  Vs E S  (3.2)
where  ei is replaced with  the equilibrium  composition  of public  funds Ci(s).  This
condition  imply aid-flows identical to the benchmark  equilibrium.  That  is, ex post,
aid will be  allocated  to  the  country  in most  need.  At an optimum,  the  marginal
utility  of aid across the  two countries  is equalized.
In  the  first  stage  of the  game  the  two  recipients  siinultaneously  and  non-
cooperatively  choose adjustment  effort.  The equilibrium  aid flows, implicitly  de-
fined by  equation  (3.2),  will then  act  as incentive  constraints  on the  recipients'
maximnization programs.  Inserting  these  aid flows into the welfare function  (2.1),
and taking  the first-order  condition  with  respect  to ki yields:
q'(ki)  [Q  -Ail  =e,  i =  1, 2  (3.3)
It  is now straightforward  to  show  that  ki  <  k<  . Suppose  that  ki  =  ki,  then
[Q-  Alt']  <  [Q- - Af], implying that  ki #7  k,?. Suppose instead  that  k 1 > kO. As
the  left-hand  side  of (3.3) is decreasing  in ki,  this  cannot  be true  either.  Hence,
e: is unambiguously  lower than  k0. Because of symmetry,  k3 ='  ==  k3. T
In other  words,  the  donor's  incentive to  push the  outcome  towards  the  first-
best,  will drive the  equilibrium  towards  the third-best.  Note  that  each recipient
will choose a strictly  positive  effort level even though  lower effort will be  (partly)
compensated  by increased  aid flows. The reason for this is that  due to  a fixed aid
budget,  only  A/2  is disbursed  to  each individual  recipient  in the  worse state  of
nature  (,B,,3).
The welfare implications  could be  summarized  as follows. The donor  and the
poor  groups are strictly  better  off in the  contract  equilibrium than  in the discre-
tionary  environment,  while the  welfare effects of the  recipient  governments  are
ambiguous.  The  reason for this  is that  in the  discretionary  equilibrium  the  indi-
vidual  government  does not  internalize the positive  externality  between expected
aid disbursement  to  country  j  and  adjustment  effort in  country  i.  Hence,  the
effort choice of the recipient  government may be too  low. To see this we can solve
for the cooperative  outcome  under  discretion.
10Definition  3.3.  The  discretionary cooperation equilibrium is a vector of feasible
policies  (k  I,  k2,  a<, a2)  such  that:  (i)  ai =  argmaxZ  'tu (ci)  Vs  E S, s.t.  the
clonor's budget constraint,  (ii) k = argmaxELl  WZ)
The following Lemma states  the  main result of this  equilibrium.
Lenma  3.4.  A  time-consistent  cooperation  equilibrium  has higher levels of ad-
justment  effort than  in the third-best,  ki > k0.
Proof.  See appendix  A.3. i
If the gain of increased  aid flows in bad  relative good states  is outweighed by
the loss of too low levels of adjustment  effort, welfare of the recipient  governments
is higher in the  contract  equilibrium than  in the  discretionary  environment.
In summary, conditionality could partly  solve the incentive problem  (inevitably)
present  in many  situations  in which the  donor  and  recipients  interact,  but  this
requires a strong  commlitment ability by the donor.  Without  such a commitment
technology  aid will be allocated  according to the needs of the recipients, resulting
hi underinvestment,  or too low adjustment  effort by the recipient governments.  In
the following section we describe two arrangements  under which the incentives for
ex post  recontracting  are eliminated,  and  which are  able to  sustain  second-best
outcomes.
4.  Alternative  Aid  Institutions
IThe  question we ask in this  section is whether  it is possible to design institutions
sD as to push the discretionary  equilibrium closer to  the second-best  equilibrium.
Two different  scenarios are considered.  In the  first case, the set  of policy instru-
ments  available for the  donor is expanded  by allowing for tied project  aid. In the
second case, an  additional  donor with  different preferences over the  allocation  of
foreign aid is introduced.
4.1.  Tied  aid
In this  subsection  we describe  an  alternative  method  to  deal with  the  incentive
problems  in  foreign assistance,  namely  tied  project  aid.  We define tied  aid  as
contracted  by source to  private  firms in the donor country, non-financial  project
transfer  of resources.
Project  aid in general, and tied project  aid in particular,  have received a great
deal of attention  and criticism in the aid literature.  A general conclusion that  has
eimerged  from this  research is that  if aid is highly fungible, targeting  assistance to
11specific projects  is essentially  a futile  exercise. 9 Furthermore,  tying  aid resources
by source and  end use to  firms within  the donor country  is seen only as a way to
increase  the  commercial impact  of the  aid program.  However, these  conclusions
may in fact  be  reversed once we take  into account  how tied  aid affect the  time-
consistency problem  in foreign assistance.
The main reason for this result is that  tied aid is contractible.  That  is, contrary
to  many  international  agreements  where  there  are no third  party  or institution
that  can enforce contracts,  tied project  aid is contractible  within the donor coun-
try.  Furthermore,  such a contract  is credible not  only because  of the  use of legal
institutions  within  the  donor  country,  but  because the  third  party  involved, i.e.
the  private  firms within  the  donor  country,  is likely to  enforce the  contract  for
profit-maximizing  reasons.  Hence, by exploiting domestic  institutions  the  donor
achieves some commitment  power in the international  policy game.
To make the  analysis more realistic,  we consider both  the  case when tied  aid
is as efficient as non-tied  aid and the  case when tied  aid is not.  Since tied  aid is
likely to  involve transaction  costs within  the  donor  country, the second  scenario
is more realistic.  In other words, contractibility  acts as a constraint  that  reduces
efficiency. However, it turns  out  that  tied aid can serve a useful role even though
it is only an imperfect  substitute  for non-tied  aid.
4.1.1.  A  modified  model
Let tied  project  aid be  denoted  by  ti.  We assume  that  the  level of tied  aid is
determined  before the  outcome  is realized.  This  seems like a reasonable  timing
assumption,  since tied  aid is an aid form which captures  better  commitment  pos-
sibilities  through  the  use of domestic  institutions.  More precisely, we postulate
that  a project  realized through  tied  aid takes one period  to implement.
Tied  aid  is less efficient than  non-tied  aid.  Hence, a fraction  ,  of resources
used for tied project  aid will be wasted,  where pz  > 0.
Assume  initially  that  y  =  0, so that  tied  aid  is as efficient as non-tied  aid.
Then,  ex post, once the shock is realized and the level of tied  aid determined,  the
donor solves:
2
max E  u (yi  - h(ai + ti))  yi =  -y,/5, i =  1 2  (4.1)
{ai}  i=l
subject  to:
A=Zai  +ti  (4.2)
i=l
9Whether  or  not  aid  is fungible  is an  empirical  question.  Boone  (1994,1995)  present  evidence
supporting the notation of fungibility.
12It  is now straightforward  to prove the following Proposition.
Proposition  4.1.  The donor can implement  the second-best equilibrium by using
a combination  of tied  and non-tied  aid.
Proof.  If t,  =  t2 =  a,2(-y,  P) =  a4(p, y), the first-order  condition  with  respect to
a,  of the maximization  program  (4.1), in aggregate state  (-y,  /3) can be written  as:
2(_Y"3)))h!  2(  ,  2<  0  (4.3) u' (-y  + d (a,  +  al(y  I)  hS-  u'(3  + h (a2 + al2y ))  h' <  (-3
which  is strictly  negative.  Hence, it is optimal,  ex post, to  allocate  all available
aid to country 2. By construction,  then,  the total  level of aid disbursed to country
2 is a (-y,  ,i).  By symmetry,  the opposite  result holds in state  (3, -y). Given these
aid-flows it  follows from  proposition  2.4 that  it  is optimal  for the  recipients  in
period  1 to  choose k, = k2 = k2.*
Hence, by tying up part  of the  available funds in tied project  aid the  second-
best  outcome  can  be  implemented.  Note  that  it  is not  optimal  to  tie  up  all
aid resources,  t  <  A/2.  Thus,  there  exists  a  trade-off  between  flexibility  and
credibility.  Due to  the  uncertain  enviromnent,  it is optimal  to provide more  aid
to  countries  in bad  states.  These  resources would not  be  available if all aid was
tied.
The  intuition  for this  result  is straightforward.  Ex post it is optimal  for the
donor  to  equalize  the  marginal  utilities  of  aid  across  the  two  countries.  The
recipients realize this,  and will therefore choose too low effort ex ante. By credibly
tying up part  of the aid budget, the donor ties its own hands.  As a result,  it is no
longer possible  to  equalize the  marginal  utilities  of aid across  countries  ex post.
Hence, the necessary  incentives to  induce the  recipients to choose k2 are created.
When As > 0 the second-best outcome  can never be implemented.  In this  case,
the donor faces a trade-off between waste of aid resources and  creating incentives
to  induce the recipients  to choose higher effort. Intuitively, under  discretion  effort
is too  low whereas  the  allocation  of aid  is set  optimally.  At  the  margin  it  is
therefore  optimal  to  accept  some waste  of aid resources  in  exchange  for higher
effort ex ante.  This  intuitive  argument  is formalized in proposition  4.3.
Let  the  indirect  utility  function  of the  donor  be  WD ([, m),  where  m  is a
vector  of exogenous parameters,  and  denote  the  donor's  expected  welfare under
discretion  as EWD. Then we have the following proposition:
Proposition  4.2.  There  exists  a threshold  value /2>  0 such that  for any  ,i  E
[0,  A) the donor is strictly  better  off in the tied  aid case than  in  the third  best.
13Proof.  Both  the  budget  constraint  and  the  donor's  utility  function  are contin-
uous.  Hence, by Berge's  Maximum  Theorem  the value function  W  is continuous
in all arguments.  From proposition  2.4 it follows that  WD  (O,  m)  > EWD1. Propo-
sition 4.3 is then  immediate  from the continuous property  of W.-
Corollary  4.3.  If  the  gain of increased aid flows in  bad relative good  states  is
outweighed  by  the  loss, due  to  the  coordination  failure,  of too  low  adjustment
effort, there also exists a [  > 0 such that  the recipient governments  are better  off
in the tied  aid case than  in the  discretionary  equilibrium.
Proof.  Immediate  from proposition  4.3.
The optimal  composition  between  non-tied  and tied  aid can be found  in two
steps." 0 First,  define the vectors of net-aid  flows (i.e. net of waste)  that  implement
a  given effort level as  a function  of the  efficiency parameter  ,u, to  be  [a,(s, h),
a2(s,,)].  Then,  since tied  aid  is chosen  ex ante, the  equilibrium  vector  of net-
aid flows must  be  identical  to  the vectors  of aid flows that  solve the  second-best
problem  (section 2.4), with  the  aggregate  aid budget,  An, equal to  E2  ao(s,),
Vs E S.  That  is:
max }  E  Q(S)U(Ci(s))]  (4.4)
subject  to:
O(c) +  (p(y  - d* -ki) + 2 E Q(S)U  (Ci(s))  >  Ew',  i =1,  2  (4.5)
scss
q'(k)  [Qi-Ai]  =  ,  i =  1,2  (4.6)
2




An =  a  ci(s) + 2(1 -,u)t  = A-  2,ut  (4.8)
i=l
Second,  for such  a problem  we have  shown that  incentives for higher  effort
require an optimal  allocation  of aid such that  the marginal  utilities  of aid are not
equalized across countries  in mixed states.
l 0An equivalent way to solve the  problem is through backward induction.  However, due
to nested  implicit  functions,  the  evaluation  of how the  endogenous  variables  change  with  it is
simplified by exploiting  the  previous  result  of the  model  as described  above.
14With  these  observations  in hand  we can solve for the  optimal  composition  of
non-tied  aid, that  is the last stage of the game, denoted  by superscripts  nt  as:
aet(,B)  =)  =  a2't(/,Y)  = 0  (4.9)
ant(y,  )  =  e2 t(f,  i) =  2 (A - 2t)  (4.10)
ant(3,  y)  =  ae2t(-,/3)=A-2t  (4.11)
where  t  is the  level of tied  aid.  (4.9)-(4.11) implies that  it  is always optimal  ex
post to  allocate  all available funds to the country  in most need.
Using  the  composition  of non-tied  aid  given in  (4.9)-(4.11),  and  given the
vectors  of net-aid  flows from the  maximization  program  (4.4)-(4.7), we can solve
for the  equilibrium  level of tied aid, given by:
t(p)  =  a,  ((-y,  ),  ))/(I  - p)  (4.12)
For a given ,p, equation  (4.12) gives a mapping  from the  space of possible  t into
itself:  a  given t  implies  a  given net  level of aid  disbursed  from  (4.8),  and  from
the maximization  program  (4.4)-(4.7) vectors of net-aid  flows [a,(s, u),  a2(s, /1)],
which in turn  implies a new level of tied  aid from  (4.12). The fixed point  of this
mapping  is denoted  by t*.  The following Lemma states  the  important  result  of
this  section.
Lemma  4.4.  If  the  amount  of tied  aid is given  by t*, the  donor minimizes  the
waste  of aid resources while at  the  same time  creating incentives  to  induce  the
recipients  to  choose a given effort level, k.
Proof.  Note  first that  since it is always optimal  ex post to allocate  all available
aid funds to the  country  in most  need, the total  net aid allocated  to country  2 in
state  (,y, /),  and  symmetrically  to  country  1 in state  (3, -y), is equal to:
(1 -,u)t*  + A-2t*  = a1 ((-y,  /),  u) + An  - 2t*(1 -,u)  =  a2  ((y,  ), U)  (4.13)
Hence, the implemented  net allocation will be given by:  [a,(s, [t),  a2 (s, ,u)].  Notice
furthermore  that  the IC-constraints  (4.6) bind when the  allocation  of aid follows
[al(s, A), a2(s,t)].  Thus,  t  <  t* cannot  be optimal  since this  would increase  aid
flows to  the country  in most  need, resulting  in too  low effort by the  recipients  ex
ante, that  is ki < k.  On the  other  hand,  t  > t* cannot  be  optimal  either.  This
is so for two reasons.  First,  more resources than  necessary  are wasted  in  order
to  create  the  incentives for the  recipients to  choose k.  Second, too  little  aid  is
given to the country in most need.  Both effects unambiguously  reduce the donor's
welfare. i
15Corollary  4.5.  An  increase  in  it  leads  to  a reduction  in  t*  and  in  the  optimal
level  of e.
Proof.  See appendix  A.4.-
When  p. rises  the  cost  of creating  incentives  for  high  effort  also  increases.  As
a result,  less incentives  are  created.  This  can be  implemented  in  two  ways,  either
by  reducing  the  level  of  tied  aid  or  by  lowering  the  equilibrium  level  of  effort.
Because  both  t* and  e  are  continuous  in ,u, the  donor  will  choose  to  adjust  both
variables.
4.2.  Delegation
A  well  known  result  from  the  political  economy  literature  on monetary  and  fiscal
policy  is that  delegation  to  an  agent  with  different  objectives  may  help  to  relax
binding  incentive  constraints."'  In this  section  we show that  a similar  result  applies
to  the  timne consistency  problem  in foreign  aid  policy.
In  real  life there  are  many  donors  interacting  on  the  aid-scene.  Of  these  the
VWorld  Bank  and  the  IMF  have  come  to  play  an  important  role.  The  policies  of
these  institutions  are  often  criticized  for  being  to  too  conservative  and  inflexible,
pursuing  policies  that  may  increase  efficiency  but  at  the  cost  of increased  poverty,
that  is cuts  in social  spending.  It  is argued  that  a more  flexible  donor  with  stronger
emphasis  on  poverty  alleviation  will strike  a better  balance  between  efficiency  and
flexibility  [see e.g.  Havnevik  (1987)  and  the  discussion  in Summers  et  al.  (1993)].
However,  we show  below  that  this  claim  may  in  fact  be  reversed.  A  less  flexible
donor,  that  is  a  donor  with  less  aversion  to  poverty,  or  stronger  emphasis  on
aggregate  efficiency,  will increase  welfare  of the  poor. 12
To  simplify  we  assume  that  the  relative  poverty  aversion,  denoted  by  q,  is
constant.  Hence:
u"t (cl) el
tt u'(c1)  1  (4.14)
U  (el)
Given  this  assumption,  we can  exploit  the  first-order  condition  (3.2)  to  determine
the  relative  poverty  aversion  for  the  donor  considered  above  as:
Cll  (y, 0)e  (C' (-y (i)) u' (C2'  (-y, ))  h'(al (7, 03))  (415
[ul (Cll  (y,  )]h'  (al (-y,  3))
' 1For a survey of the political economy  literature, see Persson & Tabellini (1990). For a model
of  delegation  in  an  international  context,  see  e.g.  Persson  & Tabellini  (1995).
12Of  course,  the  World  Bank  (and  the  IMF)  also  have  other  aims  than  poverty  alleviation,
which  may  result  in  other  binding  incentive  constraints  [see  e.g.  Rodrik  (1995)  and  Boycko  et
al.  (1996)].
16Notice  that  the  donor's  welfare  function  is utilitarian  if  ij  =  0 in  which  only
total  income  counts  and  becomes  more  Rawlsian  as q increases.  In  other  words  a
higher  71  implies  a higher  aversion  to  relative  poverty  or less emphasis  on aggregate
consumption  or efficiency  [cf. Behrman  & Sah  (1984)].
Evaluating  equation  (4.15),  it  is obvious  that  a lower  r1  leads  to  a  shift  in  aid
flows  away  from  the  recipient  country  with  the  lowest  income  (revenue).  In  the
limit  as  -*  0,  aid  will be  split  equally  between  the  two  countries  irrespective  of
the  state  of the  world.  We  can  now  state  the  main  result  of this  section.
Proposition  4.6.  The  second-best  outcome  can  be  implemented  by  delegating
responsibility  to  a donor  agency  with  less  relative  aversion  to  poverty.
Proof.  It  is immediate  from  (4.15)  that  a donor  agency  with  relative  aversion  to
poverty  given  by  1*, where:
Cl2(-y,  O)u" (C  7  i)u'  (C2(-y,  0)) h'(a'(-y, p))  (  6
[ul (Ci2(  h']  h(a2l  (7,y  ))
will implement  the  second-best.  Since  the  numerator  is smaller  and  the  denomi-
nator  is larger  in  (4.16)  than  (4.15),  t1*  <  7. E
Hence,  due  to  the  time-inconsistency  problem  present  in the  allocation  of for-
eign  aid,  it  is  optimal  for  a  bilateral  donor  to  delegate  responsibility  to  a  donor
agency  with  less  relative  aversion  to  poverty.  The  second-best  entails  giving  less
aid  for  social  spending  to  those  countries  in  most  need  in  order  to  induce  more
effort  ex  ante.  A  donor  with  less  aversion  to  poverty  will  do  just  that,  and  the
recipients  will  react  by  increasing  adjustment  efforts.
One  remark  about  this  result  is in order.  In the  case  considered  above,  the  ex-
ecution  of the  whole  aid  program  is delegated  to  an agency  with  q =  q*. However,
the  second-best  could  also be implemented  by delegating  part  of the  aid  budget  to
an  agency  with  11  <  q* and  disburse  the  remaining  aid  according  to  the  first-order
condition  (3.2).
This  result  has  a  strong  implication.  If the  policy  game  described  above  is
important  in reality,  the  advocates  of the  poor  may  do  themselves  (and  the  poor)
a  disservice  by  calling  for  a  more  poverty  oriented  foreign  aid  approach,  in  the
sense  that  the  donors  should  be  more  responsive  to  the  needs  of the  poor.  The
recipients  will  be  aware  of changes  in  the  donors'  agenda,  and  may  exploit  them
in  a way  that  the  total  impact  on the  poor  may  be  low or  even  negative.  On  the
contrary,  a  stronger  emphasis  on  aggregate  efficiency  relative  poverty  alleviation
will on  average,  through  the  internal  policy  formation  process,  increase  welfare  of
the  poor.
175.  Some  Preliminary  Evidence
In this  section  we take  a first  step  to  empirically  test  the  general  prediction  of the
theory.  The  principal  implication  of the  model  is that  concessional  assistance  is
allocated  according  to  the  needs  of the  poor  ("recipients'  needs"),  and  that  the
anticipation  of this  adversely  affects  the  recipients'  incentives  to  carry  out  policies
that  would  improve  the  poor's  welfare.  Our  objective  is to  test  this  prediction  on
pooled  10-year-averaged  cross-country  data  for  the  period  1971-1990.'3  We  will
estimate  systems  of equations  given  by:
ait =  a  + /3r
2Zit  +  ±Xit_  +  a  (5.1)
ilog  nJt  =  ct'  +±  /vit  +  Cait +  i  (5.2)
where  ait  is the  average  level  of  aid  disbursed  to  country  i  at  time  t,  xit  is  a
composite  measure  of recipients'  needs,  n?it  is the  jth  indicator  of recipients'  need,
and  zit  and  vit  are  vectors  of  other  variables  that  might  be  thought  to  affect
policy  choices.  The  main  coefficients  of interest  are  7y  and  C. The  model's  basic
prediction  is that  7  >  0  and  C =  0.  Due  to  the  limitation  in  data  coverage,  we
have  to  focus  on  the  medium-run  implication  of the  model.
We employ  four different  measures  of recipients'  needs  as explanatory  variables:
infant  survival  rate  (INF),  life expectancy  rate  (LIF),  primary  school  enrollment
rate  (PRI),  and  the  log  of real  GDP  per  capita  (LGDP).  The  human  develop-
ment  indicators  are  highly  correlated  with  each  other  and  with  real  income.  For
example,  the  simple  correlations  between  LIF  and  INF,  and  LIF  and  LGDP,
respectively,  are  0.93 and  o.75.l4  To avoid  multicollinearity  among  the  recipients'
needs  indicators  in  (5.1),  we  create  a composite  measure  of INF,  LIF,  PRI  and
LGDP  by  the  method  of  principal  components.  We  denote  the  first  principal
component  from  the  set  of recipients'  needs  proxies  by  RN.  Previous  studies  on
the  determinants  of  aid  have  not  taken  the  possibility  of  multicoliinearity  into
account,  and  consequently,  in  most  cases  rejected  the  hypothesis  that  aid  flows
are  directed  towards  countries  with  low  levels  of social  development.
There  exist  a  vast  literature  on  the  impact  of  aid  on  growth.  However,  the
relationship  between  aid  and  social  development  have  received  very  little  atten-
tion."5 For  this  reason  we  concentrate  on  the  latter.  We  choose  log  clifferences
"3The choice of the length of sub-periods, as well as the  sample of countries included, are
determined by data availability.
" 4The two social indicators INF  and LIF  are derived from the  same source for several
countries, which partly explains the high correlation.
15For recent contributions see for example Boone (1996), Mosley et al.  (1987), Burnside &
Dollar (1996). These authors find that  on average aid is insignificantly  correlated with growth.
Boone (1996) also reports  result on the  effect of aid on social development.  We discuss the
differences  between our results and those obtained by Boone in the text.
18(denoted by ZSL)  rather  than  levels of the social indicators  (INF,  LIF  and  PRI)
as dependent  variables  in  equation  (5.2) because  investment  in health  care  and
education  takes time.
Previous studies  of foreign aid have used a measure of aid that  lumps together
grants  and  concessional  loans.  The World Bank  has developed  a new data  base
on  foreign aid,  where  the  grant  component  of each concessional  loan has  been
calculated  and  added  to  outright  grants  to provide  a more  accurate  measure  of
foreign aid.  The  raw  aid data  is in current  U.S. dollars.  Following Burnside  &
Dollar (1996), we convert the data  into constant  1987 dollars using the unit-value
of import  price  index from the  IFS,  and  divide the  converted  data  by real  GDP
in constant  1987 prices from the  Summers  and  Heston  (Penn World Tables 5.6)
data  set.  This provides  a real measure  of aid (denoted  by AID)  that  is constant
in terms  of its  purchasing  power over a representative  bundle of world imports.
We include as control variables in equation  (5.1) the log of population  (LPOP),
the  log of real  GDP  per  capita,  and  regional  specific dummies  for Sub-Saharan
Africa  (AFR),  East-Asia  (ASIA)  and  Central  Amnerica (CAM).  In  equation
(5.2) we include  LGDP  together  with  the  average terms  of trade  growth  (TT)
and the log of the initial  value of the explanatory  variable.  The latter  is included
to allow for a non-linear  response to initial  conditions.  We expect LPOP  to have
a negative impact  on the disbursement  of foreign aid due to a "population  bias"  in
the  allocation  of aid across recipients  [see for instance  Trumbull  & Wall (1994)].
The  three  regional  dumnmies are meant  to  capture  donors'  strategic  interests.16
LGDP  is included  in  (5.2) to take  into account how initial  differences in income
affect growth in human  capital.  These control variables  are chosen so as to mimic
other  empirical  studies  on  aid.  To minimize  problems of reverse causality,  they
are, unless otherwise noted,  measured  at the start  of the time  period.
5.1.  Empirical  results
Since cit-I  in  (5.1) is a predetermined  variable,  equations  (5.1)-(5.2) define a re-
cursive system in which there is unidirectional  dependency  among the endogenous
variables.  Hence,  as long as there  are no contemporaneous  correlation  between
ea and  c',  i.e.  E[£aC']  =  0, OLS applied  to  equation  (5.1) and  (5.2) separately
is a consistent  and  efficient estimator.  Table  1 shows the result  of least  squares
estimation.
The composite  measure  of recipients'  needs is highly significant, and  with the
predicted  sign.  The  magnitude  of this  effect is  considerable.  A  one-standard
deviation  decrease  in  the  recipient's  needs  measure,  RN,  is associated  with  an
1 6European  countries  direct most aid to Sub-Saharan  Africa,  Central America  is in the U.S.
sphere  of influence,  and Japan directs  most of its aid towards  East Asia.
19increase in the  inflow of constant  aid with  1.24 percent  of real GDP. In accordance
with  previous empirical  findings, there  also seems to be a population  bias present
in the  overall allocation  of aid.  The coefficient on LPOP  is negative  and  highly
significant,  indicating  that  smaller  countries  on average receive more aid.  Apart
from these  two variables,  only the  dummy  variable for East  Asia is significantly
different from zero.
Table  1
AID  ALPRI  ALLIF  ALINF  AID
Expl.var.  (la)  (lb)  (lc)  (ld)  (le)
LPOP  -2.12**  -1.73**
(0.39)  (.28)
RN  -1.24**  -1.34**
(027)  (.22)
AFR  .70  .37
(.53)  (.40)
ASIA  .99*  .80*
(.46)  (.40)
CA  -.57  -.38
(.35)  (.34)
LGDP  .04  .01  .003
(.03)  (.01)  (.002)
TT  .26  .04  .013
(.14)  (.02)  (.008)
AID  -.18  .007  -.02







no. obs.  162  135  176  176  160
adj. R2  0.47  0.47  0.13  0.21  0.53
Note: OLS estimation on pooled (1971-80,  81-90) data.  Heteroskedastic-
consistent standard  errors  [White (1980)] in parenthesis.  * (**) denote
significance at the 5 (1) % level. The coefficients  and standard errors on
AID  are multiplied by 100. Each regression include a constant and a time
dummy not reported here.
In column  (lb)-(ld)  the  results  of the  reverse relationship  are depicted.  As
predicted,  in  neither  of the  specifications the  coefficient on aid is significant.  It
20is revealing to  compare  the  coefficients on AID  and  TT.  The reason  for this  is
twofold.  First,  higher export  prices are likely to benefit  a large part  of the poor
population  (in  rural  areas)  directly,  while foreign aid is channeled  through  the
government.  Second, since trade  taxes  are important  sources of revenue in many
dleveloping countries,  TT  shows the  effect of an exogenous change in government
revenue  holding  the  level  of aid  constant.  If  aid  was treated  as  a  exogenous
source of income  by the  recipient  governments,  the  government  induceed impact
on poverty  reduction  from  AID  and  TT  should be  similar.  However, as shown
in  table  1, the  coefficient  on  TT  is positive  and  significant  at  the  10 %  level
in  (lb)  and  only  barely  insignificant  in  (lc)-(ld),  while the  signs  on AID  are
hiighly insignificant  and in fact even negative in two specifications.  These findings
suggest that  the aid relationship might create  adverse incentive effects that  reduce
the  effectiveness of foreign assistance.  Finally, in all specifications the  coefficient
on the  initial  value of the  dependent  variable  is negative  and  highly significant,
indicating  diminishing  marginal  returns  to human  capital.
An important  question  is whether  the results  in table  1 are robust  to  alterna-
tive specifications  and  particular  observations.  An examination  of the  residuals
[columns (la)-(ld)]  reveals a few outlying observations.  However, as shown in col-
umn  (le) and table 2, dropping these observations from the sample only strengthen
the  results.7'  Notice  that  the  effects of TT  are positive  and  highly significant,
while the  impact  of foreign aid is similar  to  that  reported  in table  1.  This  dis-
tinction  neatly  fits the prediction  of the model  and underlies  the  general idea of
the paper  that  the  aid relationship  may create  adverse incentive constraints  that
undermine  the  overall purpose  of assisting the poor.
The  results  reported  in table  1 are  also robust  to  alternative  specifications.
For example,  we  included  two  more  dummy  variables  to  proxy  for  recipients'
nieeds: Egypt  (which receives a large  share  of U.S. aid)  and  Fianc  zone  (which
gets special  treatment  from  FEance), as well as a measure  of arms  imports  as a
share of total  iInports  lagged one period.  We also added two variables to equation
(5.2) to  proxy  for political  polarization  and  instability  that  might  influence the
allocation of public funds:  ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  and frequency of major
cabinet  changes."8 Moreover, we included  the  square  of the  log of real GDP  per
capita  to  capture  the  potentially  non-linear  relationship  between  initial  income
aLnd  human  capital  accumulation.  The results  can be summarized  as follows. The
highly significant effect of recipients'  needs motives on foreign aid disbursements
17Only  the results on TT  and AID  are shown  in table 2  The full regression  results are
available  on request.
'8See Easterly  & Levine  for a discussion  of the impact  of ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  and
Svensson  (1996)  for a model of aid and the allocation  of public  funds under a divided  policy
process.
21continues  to  hold,  while  AID  is insignificantly  different  from  zero in  all  three
specifications.  All three  proxies for donors'  interest  have the  right sign, but  only
the dummy  variable for Egypt  is significant at  conventional levels.  The  political
variables  are  in  two  out  of three  specifications  insignificant  and  initial  income
seems to have  a non-linear  effect on human  capital  accumulation:  the  square  of
the log of real GDP  is significantly negative.
So far we have  carried  out the  analysis  under  the  assumption  that  E[Pen]  =  0.
However, if this  is not  true  a1 lt  and  _nt  may be contemporaneously  correlated,  im-
plying  that  OLS is an  inconsistent  estimator.  We can test  for contemporaneous
correlation between the two equations using the Langrange multiplier  statistic  sug-
gested by Breusch  & Pagan  (1980).  For the bench-mark  specifications,  columns
(la)-(lb:d)  the  statistics  are  [0.16 5.24 1.86].  The  5 % critical  value  from  the
x(l)-distribution  is 3.84, implying that  the null hypothesis  of no contemporaneous
correlation  is rejected  in one  out  of three  cases.  One way to  cope with  contem-
poraneous  correlation  is to jointly  estimate  the model  (5.1)-(5.2).  Table 3 reports
the  result  on the  human  development  indicators  of 2SLS regressions.  As evident
the  results  are similar to those  reported  in table  2.
Table 2
ALPRI  ALLIF  ALINF
Expl.var.  (2a)  (2b)  (2c)
A4D  -.10  -.04  -.04*
(.42)  (.03)  (.02)
IT  .30*  .029*  .025**
(.13)  (.015)  (.007)
no. obs.  133  171  125
adj.R2  0.55  0.16  0.37
Note: OLS estimation on pooled (1971-80, 81-90) data.  Heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors [White (1980)]  in parenthesis. * (**) denote sig-
nificance  at the 5 (1) % level. The coefficients  and standard errors on AID
are multiplied by 100. Each regression include a constant, time dummy,
and the same regressors as in column (lb)  not reported here.
The results  reported  above differ partly  from those obtained  by Boone (1996).
Boone finds no evidence that  the poor  benefits from aid, nor that  aid is primar-
ily motivated  to  assist  the  poor.  On the  contrary  we find a robust  relationship
between  aid  flows and  recipients'  needs.  The reason  for this  difference is three-
fold.  First,  we use  a  different  data  set  which  only  includes  foreign  aid in  the
form of grants  (cf.  discussion  above).  Second, we explicitly  test  a simultaneous
22system.  Finally, we construct  a composite  measure  of recipients'  needs  to  avoid
multicollinearity  among the different social and economic indicators.
In summary, the data reveals a positive and robust effect of recipients'  needs on
the allocation  of foreign aid. At the same time, there is no evidence that  these aid
flows have helped  the  poor.  This result  is even more striking when compared  to
an exogenous increase  in income (due to a change in terms of trade),  which have a
positive impact  on the welfare of the poor.  One, but  not the  only, interpretation
of these  findings  is that  aid  is (partly)  motivated  to  assist  the  poor,  and  that
the anticipation  of this  adversely affects the recipient  govemments'  incentives to
carry  out policies that  would  alleviate poverty.  Overall, these  findings stress the
importance  of viewing aid flows and  macroeconomic  outcome  as a simultaneous
relation.
Table  3
ALPRI  ALLIF  ALINF
Expl.var.  (3a)  (3b)  (3c)
LGDP  .63  .19**  .05*
(.57)  (.07)  (.02)
LGDP2 -.09  -.03**  -.008*
(.09)  (.01)  (.003)
'T  .27*  .030  .016*
(.13)  (.021)  (.008)
AID  -.41  -.13  -.06*







no. obs.  135  101  159
Note: White's Two-Stage-Instrumental-Variable  estimation [White (1980)]
on pooled (1971-80,  81-90) data.  * (**) denote significance  at the 5 (1) %
level. The coefficients and standard errors on AID  are multiplied by 100.
Each regression include a constant and a time dummy not reported here.
6.  Conclusion
The present  model  has  abstracted  from a number  of issues influencing the  game
between the  donor  and  the recipient.  The analysis may therefore  be  biased and
23it  would be  inappropriate  to  draw  definite  conclusions, let  alone to  make  final
policy recommendations.  Nevertheless,  some important  insights emerge from the
analysis.  First  it is shown that  one reason for the poor aggregate record of foreign
aid may be a moral  hazard  problem that  adversely  affects the  aid recipients'  in-
centives to undertake  structural  reforms.  In principle, conditionality  could partly
solve the  problem,  but  this  requires a strong  commitment  ability by the  altruis-
tic  donor.  Contrary  to  conventional wisdom  in the  aid literature,  we show that
without  such  a commitment  technology, delegation  of part  of the  aid budget  to
an  international  agency with  less aversion to poverty  as well as tied  project  aid
may improve welfare for all parties.
The  empirical  implication  of the  model  is that  aid  (partly)  is allocated  ac-
cording  to  the  needs  of the  poor,  and  the  anticipation  of this  adversely  affects
the recipients'  incentives to carry out policies that  would improve the  poor's wel-
fare.  We provide  some  preliminary  support  for this  conjecture.  In  particular
we show that  the  effects of an exogenous change in income  (due to  variations  in
the terms  of trade)  is distinctively  different from the  effects of changes in foreign
aid, indicating  that  the  aid relationship  may create  adverse incentive constraints
undermining  the overall purpose  of assisting  the poor.
By  looking  at  a  two-period  model  we have disregarded  reputational  forces.
The fact that  the  donor and the  recipients interact  repeatedly,  may create forces
that  can substitute  for commitment.  On  the  other  hand,  these  forces may  not
be  strong  enough  to  sustain  the  second-best  outcome,  since the  donor  and  the
recipient  governments  can communicate  and  renegotiate  pledged  commitments,
which undermines  the threat  of punishment  [see Fundenberg  & Tirole  (1992) for
a textbook  treatment  of these  issues].
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A.  Appendix
A.1.  Optimal  contract  when  adjustment  effort  is verifiable
The first-order conditions with respect to a, (s) are:
Q(s) [u' (Cl (s)) h'(al (s)) -u'  (C2(s)) h' (a2(s))]  (A.1)
+2Q(s) [Aiu' (Cl (s)) h' (al (s)) - A2u! (C2(s)) h' (a2(s))] = 0, for all s E S
where Ai is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the IR-constraint.  By symmetry,
Ai =  A in equilibrium.  By concavity of u(-) it is the only solution.  Thus, the first-
best  equilibrium entails full consumption smoothing across countries, independent of
q and  V.  At an optimum, the marginal utility of aid is equalized across countries in
all states.  That  is:  al(s) = A/2,  for all s r  Ss, and a'(,y)  =  a'(,y,)  >  A/2, and
aj(,y,/3) = a'(j,y)  < A/2.
Denote the equilibrium without aid with superscript 0.  Since the donor does not
derive any utility from government consumption, the IR-constraints bind in equilib-
rium. Hence, the optimal amount of effort (or investment) is implicitly defined by the
individual rationality constraint (2.6). That is:
[q(kl)14 + (1 - q(ki)) Al] -2  [q(k0)u(Iy)  + (1  - q(kO))  u(23)]  (A2)
=%o(kl  -k  + Ad,)
27where  di', _  v,l'(yp)  and  Ad  -(di,  - dil)  < 0,  and where:
Q21  _2q(k2)u  (C(y,y  ))  2 (1 - q(k2))  u (C  (7y,0))  (A.3)
-2q(k 2)u (c1 3(B,))  + 2 (1  - q(k2)) u (c (i3,is))  (AA4)
Suppose that  ki  =  ko.  Then  since Q1  > u('-y)  and  Al  > u( 163)  the  left-hand  side  of
(A.2) is strictly  positive.  So ki :&  k  . Because the left-hand  side of (A.2) is an increasing
and  concave function  of ki,  we know there,  at  the  most, exists two effort levels, ki  > ko
and  k,  < ko, such that  (A.2) holds.  Note that  the  donor's  welfare is strictly  increasing
kl.  Hence, kl  > ko. Because  of symmetry  and concavity  of q, k'  = k_ = k'.
A.2.  Optimal  contract  when  adjustment  effort  is  not  verifiable
For a given level of adjustment  effort,  ki =  k, the  optimal  contract  is found by  solving
the  following maximization  program:
2
max E  E  Q(s)u  (Ci(s))  (A.5)
(Zz2  i=1  SES
s.t.  (2.5),  (2.6), and:
2 E  Q(s)u  (Ci(s)) -k  > 2 E  Q(s)u  (Ci(s))  - ki,  Vkj e  [°,y]  (A.6)
ses  ses
where  Q(s) denotes  the probability  of aggregate  state  s, given adjustment  level k.  Since
q(k)  is concave  and  differentiable,  and  the  total  development  spending  scheme  is non-
decreasing,  the  indirect  utility  function  W(ki,  kj)  is concave  and  differentiable.  The
infinite  set of relative  incentive  constraints  for recipient  i, given in (A.6), can therefore
be replaced  with  a single "first-order  constraint"  [see Laffont  (1989) for the  validity  of
the  first-order  approach]:
q(k) [R-A  - Ai]  i = 1,  2  (A.7)
where  ￿
2
j  and  Ai are defined  in section  2.3.  The Lagrangian  for this  problem  is:
2
max  L(ai,A,v)  =  E  Z  (s)u(Ci(s))  (A.8)
i=l  sGs
+Al  Iv (e) +  y - cril-  k] + 2 E  Q(s)u (Cl(s))]
+A 2 [v (c) +  [y - crl-  k  + 2 E  Q(s)u (C2(s))]
ses
28+VI [d(k)  (fl-  Al)]+  +2  [dk(2A2)]
The first-order  conditions  are:
±2Q(s)LXiu' (C 1 (y, y))  h' (al(y,y))  - A2 u  (C2(y, y))  h' (a2(7,Y))1
+2q'(e)q(e)[viu'  (C1(1y,y)) h'  (al(,y,  y))  - V2u' (C 2(-y,-y))  h'  (a2(-Y,Y))]  =  0
Q(s) [ut (C 1 (3,13)) h'  (al (f3,3))  - u'  (C2(3,3))  h'  (a2(13,  3))]  (A.10)
+2Q(s) [Alu  (Cl (i3,f3)) h' (al (i3, 3))  - A2U/ (C2 (/3 ,3)) h' (a2 (,  ,3))]
-2q  (e) (1 - q(e)) [vlu'  (C1(3,/,))  h' (al (,  ,))  - V21  (C2(3,  )) h' (a2(/3,13))1  =  0
('y, /3)  [u' (C  y ,/3)  ) h' (a,(y,13))  - u'  (C2('y,/3)) h' (a2 (7, t3))]  (A.ll  )
±2Q(-y,13)  [Alu' (C1(y,  3)) h' (al (y,/3))  - A2u  (C2(-y,,3)) h' (a2(y,/i))]
±2q'(e)fv(l  - q(e))u' (Cl(y,/3))  h' (al  +(,t))  ± v2q(j)ud (C2(7,13)) h  (a2(Y,13))]  = 0
Q(/3,y)[u/  (Cl (13,,y))  h' (a, (3, y)) - u' (C2(/,  y)) h' (a3(3,7))]  (A.12)
12Q(,B,  y)[Ai u' (Ci (3, y)) h' (al (3,7y)) - A2u  (C2(/3,  -y)) h' (a2  (,3,Y))]
-2q'(E) [lq(6)u'  (Cl (,3,7y)) h' (a, (3,  y)) + V2(1 - q(E))u' (C 2(f,  -y)) h' (a2(/3,7))] = 0
The  constraints  are given by  (2.6),  (A.7) and the  inequality  constraints:
Ai>  O,  voi  >O  i =1,2  (A.13)
and  the  four complementary  slackness conditions  are:
Ai [v (c) + up[y  -dl-  k} + 2Z,  Q(s)u (Ci(s)) -Ew9]  = O, i = 1,2  (A.14)
SES
vi[(e  (5R- - i) -S]  =  O,  i =  1, 2  (A.15)
Ely symmetry,  Ai =  A, vi  =  zv and  Ci(-y,,3) =  Cj(13,y)  for  i =  1,2,  j  = 1,2,  i  $&  j.
EBy  concavity  of u(.)  it is the  only solution.  Exploiting  the  symmetry  of the  model to
s:implify,  the  first-order  conditions  of the  program  can be written  as:
[(1 + 2A)Q(s)  +2vp]  [ue  (CI(s))  h' (al(s))  -u'  (C2(s)) h'(a 2(s))]  =  0,  for  all s E Ss
(A.16)
and:
(1 + 2A)Q(s)  [u' (Cl(s))  h(al(s))  -u'  (C2(s)) h(a 2(s))] +  (A.17)
2uwrq'(e) [pfu (C1(s))  h  (al(s))  + (1 - P)u'  (C1 (s))  h2(az(s))]  =  0,  for  all  s E  Sa
In  a symmetric  equilibrium,  A, =  A and  vi =  v.  The variables p^  and p are defined  as:
^_ J  q'(k)q(k)  instate  (y,y)  _  q(k)  in state  (3,y) (A.18)
P  |  g-q'(k)(1-q(k))  in state (,13)  P  (1-q(k))  in state  (y,,3)
29and  7r =  1 in  state  (-y,,B) and  7r =  -1  in  state  (/3,,y).  We denote  the  second-best
equilibrium  with  superscripts  2.
If the  IC-constraints  do not bind,  then  the  first-order  conditions  result  in the  first-
best  levels  of aid  flows.  Hence,  when  there  are  no  incentive  problems,  the  optimal
arrangement  implies  equalization  of the  marginal  utilities  of aid.  However, when  the
IC-constraints  do  bind,  implying  that  v  >  0, the  level of aid  depends  on  the  prob-
ability  function  q,  as well  as the  risk  aversion  of the  donor,  the  marginal  utility  of
non-development  spending,  S°,  and  the  difference between good  and bad  states.
To pin down the optimal  effort level, we define the optimal  aid flows as a function  of
k as ai(s,k),  where  k =  [k 1 k2] is a  vector of adjustment  effort levels.  This  function  is
implicitly  given by the  first-order  conditions  (A.16)-(A.17).  Note that,  independent  of
k, ai (s,k)  =  2A for all s E S5. By differentiating  the  IC-constraints  (A.7) and  invoking
the  donor's  budget  constraint,  we have:
dk  [a, (('y,,),k)]  _  a', ((y,3),k)  =  -a,  ((O,3-y),k) > 0  (A.19)
and symmetrically  for a2(s,k).  That  is, in order to induce the recipients  to exert  higher
effort,  the  donor  must  lower the  level of aid  to  countries  with  fiscal  difficulties  and
increase  aid to  countries  in less need.  By substituting  ai(s,k)  for ai in  (A.5), and using
the  budget  constraint  to  substitute  for a2(s,k),  expected  utility  can  be expressed  as a
function  of k only.  Maximizing  W1 with  respect to k, results  in the following first-order
condition:
-2
2'(k 1)  E[q(k 2) (u (Ci(-y,  -y))  - u (Ci(3,k ) )  ) ± (1-  q (k2)) (u (Ci(y,  ))  - U  (Ci(  u-U)  ))]]
±  E  Q(s)ad(s,k)  [u'(Ci(s))h'(ai(s))  -u'(C2(s))h'(a 2(s))]  =  (A20)
and  symmetrically  for  k2. Equation  (A.20)  compares  the  marginal  gain  of increased
effort,  the  first  term,  with  the  expected  marginal  cost,  the  last  term.  The  marginal
gain  takes  the  form of increased  expected  consumption  since the  likelihood of the  good
states  increase.  The  cost  arises  because  the  marginal  utilities  of aid  across  the  two
countries  are not equalized.  Thus,  the  cost is the  relative  loss of not giving aid to those
in most  need.  Notice  that  if the  disbursement  of aid  follows the  first-best  allocation,
the  second term  in  (A20)  will vanish.  In that  case, the  first-order  condition  (A20)  is
strictly  positive  for all k.  Hence, when  k is not verifiable,  it is no longer optimal  for the
donor  to allocate  aid so as to smooth  public  consumption  of the  poor.
Given  that  assumption  1 holds,  it  is now  straightforward  to  show  that  the  IR,
constraints  never  bind.  From  the  IC-constraints  it  follows that  it  is possible  to  im-
plement  k,  >  ki° only  if  more  aid  is given to  the  country  in  good  state  than  to  the
country  in bad  state.  However, by  assumption  this  is not  optimal.  Consequently,  the
recipient  governments  are strictly  better  off in the  second-best  equilibrium  than  in the
equilibrium  without  aid.
30A.3.  Proof  of Lemma  3.4
The IC-constraint for recipient i in the cooperative environment is found by maximizing
the sum of the two recipients expected utility with respect to ki. That is:
2
ma-x E  E  [v (C)  +p(y  - cil-k)  + Q(s)u (Ci(s))]  (A21)
ktk  i=1 sSE
Using the assumption of symmetry, the IC-constraint for recipient I can be stated
as:
2q'(ki) [Qi  - Al] + 2q"(k 1) lu (Cl (3, y)) - u (Cl (p, ))] =  (A22)
Equation (A.22)  has the same interpretation as the IC-constraint (2.7), except that  now
the benefit of higher adjustment effort also accrue to  recipient 2.  In the cooperative
environment the benefits of higher adjustment effort are fully internalized. Hence,  the
left hand side of (A.22) is basically two times the left hand side of equation (2.7).The
first-order condition with respect to k, in the cooperative outcome is given in (A.22).
To prove that  k, > k3, we can rewrite (A.22) as:
p-  q(k1) [-  l  = q(k,)TI  (A23)
where T1 > 0 is defined as:
Ti  =  2q(k2) [u (Cl(,7))-u  (C(  ))  +  (A24)
2 (1 -q(k2))  [u (Cl (3,Y))  -u  (C 1 (/,/3))](
Suppose that  k, = k3. Then the left-hand side of (A.23) is zero, while q(kl)Tr  > 0.
Hence, ki 0  k . Suppose instead that  k,  <  k3. As the  right-hand side of (A.23) is
falling in  ki while the left-hand side is increasing, this cannot be true either.  Thus,
k,  > k3. Because of symmetry, k, = k2.
A.4.  Proof  of  Corollary  4.6
For a given k and t*, denoted byt,  a higher ,u implies a smaller A'  from (4.8). This
in turn  results in lower net-aid flows. That  is, ai(s,)  < ai(s,)  V p  > ,u and V s r S.
From (4.13) it follows  that:
a2 ((y,/3),  /)  = a, ((Iy,/3),  A) + A - 2t  (A25)
Assume first that  when ,u increases t is constant (= t).  Then from (A.25):
[a2 ((7,,3),Y)  - a, ((Qy,  3)  ,)J  (A.26)
is constant.  Assume instead that  t > t- then:
[a2  ((7/)s)-  al ((  /,/3  )]  (A27)
31falls.  However, evaluating  the  effects of a reduction  in A'  from the  IC-constraint  (4.6),
we obtain:
d
dAn [a2  ((y/),it)-al  ((7,y4),  i)] > 0  (A.28)
which contradicts  the  assumptions  that  t > t*.  Hence, when ,  increases  t* must  fall.
The  second part  in Corollary  4.6.  can  be shown by  following the  same  steps  as in
section 2.4.  First,  define the optimal  aid flows as a function of k and ,u: ai(s, k, ,u). Then,
inserting  ai(s,  k,,i)  into the  donor's  expected  utility  function  and taking  the  first-order
condition  with  respect  to  ki yields:
2q'(el)  [=A[q  (u  (ci(,i  ))-u  (Ci(3,-y)))  + (1 -q)  (u (Ci(y,3))  -u  (Ci  (,  ,3)))]]
+a', (s, k,  )  IQ  (,y,)  (u' (C  (-y,))) h! (al(  ,)-u  (C2 (7,3))  h'(a2 (Y, 3)))
-21  +  (te (Cl (3,,))  h'(aj  (,,y))  - t  (C2(,(3,y))  h' (a2 (,y)))]  = 
(A.29)
where the first term  in bracket  is positive  and the  second negative,  and where q =  q(k2).
An increase  in it implies that  the  first term  in the  brackets  in  (A.29) will fall since the
net  level  of aid  will  fall." 9 Moreover,  a  rise  in  it would  increase  the  second  term  in
brackets  in  absolute  values.  Moreover, since  d  ai((-y,3),k,[L)  > 0 and  q"(k1)  < 0,  ki
must  fall in order  to  restore  the  equilibrium  condition  (A.29) when  bt increases.
1 9An increase in It  cannot be completely  crowded  in by a reduction in t, since  then al ((y,/3),U)
would not change, implying that t would increase - a contradiction.
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